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ABSTRACT
A recent endogenous growth literature has focused on the transition from a Malthusian world
where real wages were linked to factor endowments, to one where modern growth has broken that link.
In this paper we present evidence on another, related phenomenon: the dramatic reversal in distributional
trends -- from a steep secular fall to a steep secular rise in wage-land rent ratios -- which occurred some
time early in the 19th century. What explains this reversal? While it may seem logical to locate the causes
in the Industrial Revolutionary forces emphasized by endogenous growth theorists, we provide evidence
that something else mattered just as much: the opening up of the European economy to international
trade.
Kevin H. O'Rourke Jeffrey G. Williamson
Department of Economics and IIIS Department of Economics
Trinity College Harvard University
Dublin 2, Ireland Cambridge, MA 02138
and NBER and NBER
kevin.orourke@tcd.ie jwilliam@harvard.edu1
1. Introduction
Over the course of the last decade, a literature has emerged in which economic theorists
have attempted to model the dramatic structural break in European living standards which
occurred at some point between 1750 and 1850. This literature has relied on a long tradition in
economic history which documents real wage indices over the long run (e.g. Phelps-Brown and
Hopkins 1956), and on more recent and speculative guesstimates of GDP and GDP per capita
(notably Maddison 1982, recently updated in Maddison 1995, 2001). The basic question which
this literature seeks to address is based on two stylized facts. First, prior to the structural break
real wages and output per capita seem to have been relatively stagnant, increasing only at a very
slow pace. This regime seems to have been consistent with the famous model offered by Thomas
Malthus (1826), in which living standards depend positively on land-labor ratios, and fertility
depends positively on living standards. In the Malthusian regime, any technological shock or
resource discovery leading to higher real wages would induce rising populations and falling real
wages, until long run equilibrium was reestablished (Lee 1973). Second, there has been a
sustained and impressive rise in living standards since the structural break. This has occurred
despite a large increase in population, suggesting that the classical Malthusian link between
living standards and land-labor ratios in England was broken sometime during the century after
1750.
The key question which modern theorists address is: How did Europe make the transition
from a Malthusian economy, in which living standards were largely determined by land-labor
ratios, to a modern economy, in which living standards were decoupled from land scarcity and2
coupled to capital accumulation and technical change? Thus, Marvin Goodfriend and John
McDermott (1995), Gary Hansen and Edward Prescott (1998), Robert Lucas (1999), Oded Galor
and David Weil (2000), Charles Jones (2001), and others explore the interactions between
population, technology and living standards over the long run. Indeed, Galor and Weil (2000:
806) have asserted that a unified model of the evolution from pre-industrial Malthusian
stagnation to the demographic transition and modern economic growth is “one of the most
significant challenges facing economists interested in growth and development.”
Economic historians have continued to produce information on long run living standards
which can better inform these modern theoretical debates. Thus, the voluminous price and wage
information collected by pioneers like Thorold Rogers (1866-1892), William Beveridge (1939),
Earl Hamilton (1934, 1936, 1947), Nicholas Posthumus (1946, 1964) and Herman van der Wee
(1963) have been used to calculate comparable, PPP-adjusted real wages for several cities across
Europe and the Mediterranean over centuries (Reher and Ballesteros 1993; Pamuk 2000; Allen
2001). Meanwhile, scholars such as Gregory Clark (2001a) and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2001)
have provided GDP estimates for individual European countries going back as far as the Middle
Ages. This focus on living standards and other macroeconomic aggregates is understandable,
since such aggregate indicators can help identify when the great divergence between advanced
and backward nations took place (Pritchett 1997; Pomeranz 2000). But relative factor prices, and
thus income distribution, deserve equal attention. After all, significant changes in income
distribution influence economic growth in many plausible models (e.g. Stokey 1991; Alesina and
Perotti 1994, 1996; Aghion and Howitt 1998; Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa 1999).
Inequality changes can also matter for the political reactions they often provoke in the form of3
dramatic switches in policy (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999). More important for the questions
posed in this paper, relative factor prices may also inform us as to the sources of economic
growth.
This paper exploits recently-collected data on relative factor prices over the very long run,
and points out that there was another, equally radical structural break which occurred in north-
west Europe at about the same time as the break in living standards: a dramatic reversal of long
run trends in the ratio of wages to land rents. Prior to the 19
th century, there had been a long
period during which the wage-land rent ratio declined, implying a rise in inequality (since land
owners were far closer to the top of the income distribution than were landless workers). This
trend was consistent with a Malthusian world in which an increasing population pressed on a
quasi-fixed land endowment, to the benefit of landlords (Hanson and Prescott 1998). At some
point in the 19
th century this pattern reversed, and wages started to rise relative to land rents,
implying a decline in inequality. This more modern trend is inconsistent with a Malthusian world
in which wage-rent ratios were determined by the land endowment per worker, since the land-
labor ratio continued to decline into the 19
th century and beyond. It appears, therefore, that there
is more evidence that the traditional link between factor prices and factor endowments was
broken some time in the 19
th century.
What explains the structural break in wage-rent ratio behavior? An obvious explanation is
that it was caused by the same industrial revolutionary forces underlying the break in living
standards behavior. Some scholars date the first industrial revolution from 1760, some from
1780, and some don’t use the word at all, but everyone agrees that the rate of technological
advance accelerated in English industry about this time (Mokyr 1990; Crafts 1994; Temin 1997).4
In a specific factors world in which two commodities are produced – agricultural products (using
land and labor) and manufactured goods (using capital and labor) -- productivity advance in
English industry should have drawn workers out of agriculture and into the cities, raising wages,
lowering rents, and inflating the ratio of wages to rents.
But this paper does not just draw attention to another stylized fact for recent growth
models to explain. Rather, it suggests that these models are often incomplete in one crucial
respect: as with many classic growth models, they assume that economies are closed (but see
Galor and Mountford 2002). We argue that the reversal in long run wage-rent ratio trends can in
large part be explained by a crucial change in the world economy that coincided with the
Industrial Revolution: Europe became dramatically more open to trade in the decades following
Waterloo. Global market integration could on its own have cut the links between factor prices
and domestic endowments, or at least weakened them dramatically.
It might be objected that intercontinental trade had been on the rise at least since the
Voyages of Discovery -- growing at around 1 percent per annum between 1500 and 1800 -- and
thus that trade should have influenced factor prices for several centuries before the structural
break occurred. However, it turns out that the measured growth in European overseas trade was
not due to global commodity market integration, as measured by a decline in intercontinental
price gaps, but rather to shifts in demand and supply in Europe, Asia and the Americas
(O’Rourke and Williamson 2002a). It was only with the new transport technologies of the 19
th
century that a sustained decline in transport costs and intercontinental price gaps began to leave
their mark; and it was only in the 19
th century that large-scale intercontinental trade in such basic
commodities as grain and animal products became possible. It follows that it was only in the 19
th5
century that intercontinental trade began to have the effects on factor prices which were
identified by two famous Swedish observers of the period, Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin (Flam
and Flanders 1991). Indeed, in earlier work we have shown that international trade did affect
wage-rent ratios in the manner identified by Heckscher-Ohlin theory in the years between 1870
and 1913: trade raised wage-rent ratios in Europe, by lowering the price of imported agricultural
products relative to the price of exported manufactured goods; and trade lowered wage-rent ratios
in the New World, by increasing the price of exported agricultural products relative to the price
of imported manufactured goods (O’Rourke and Williamson 1994, 1999; O’Rourke, Taylor and
Williamson 1996).
If the first great globalization shock hit the world economy in the early 19
th century rather
than after 1492, then it follows that European commodity prices should have been determined
primarily by domestic supply and demand prior to the early 19
th century, while they should have
been determined by global supply and demand afterwards. We test this intuition here for one
country, England, which was at the heart of the 19
th century global economy and which was thus
fully exposed to the effects of growing international trade. We ask: At what stage did English
commodity prices become decoupled from English factor endowments? What difference did the
opening up of the domestic economy to trade make to the long run evolution of relative
commodity prices in England? What were the determinants of the wage-rent ratio before the
structural break compared with their determinants afterwards? And finally, what were the relative
contributions of the industrial revolution and international trade in producing this historic
reversal in long-run wage-rent ratio trends?
Section 2 presents the wage-rent ratio evidence, while section 3 reviews the evidence6
suggesting that the 19
th century was a period of commodity market integration in a way that
earlier centuries simply were not. Section 4 presents evidence on how English factor prices were
determined in the pre-1750 period, consistent with closed economy theory, and generates
predictions as to how wage-rent ratios would have continued to evolve had the structure of the
economy remained unchanged. Section 5 compares these predictions with the post-1840 English
reality, and attempts to measure the role of industrialization and trade in accounting for the
difference between prediction and reality. Section 6 discusses the transition which the English
economy underwent between 1750 and 1840, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Wage-Rent Ratios in Western Europe Since 1450
Wage-Rent Ratio Trends in England Since 1500
Figure 1 plots three indices of wage-land rent ratios in England from 1500 to 1936. The
sources used are described in Appendix 1. Briefly, they all use the same nominal agricultural
wage series, based on recent work by Gregory Clark (2001b, n.d.) for the 16
th to the 18
th
centuries, and on older sources for the 19
th and 20
th centuries (Fox 1903; Bowley and Wood in
Mitchell 1988). The difference between the three series thus hinges on the land rent series used.
The ‘Clark’ series is based on Clark (2002) until 1831 (using data from the Charity
Commissioners), and Robert Thompson (1907) and H. A. Rhee (1949) thereafter; the Turner
series uses the estimates of M. Turner, J. V. Beckett and B. Afton (1997) wherever available, and
otherwise uses the Clark series; and the ‘Allen’ series uses Robert Allen’s (1988) South
Midlands data until 1831, and then Thompson and Rhee thereafter. All three series show a large7
decline in wage-rent ratios between 1500 and about 1850, and a substantial rise thereafter. In the
econometric exercises that follow we use the Allen series, since its overall trends offer a
compromise between the other two series, and since the Turner series is the outlier from 1600
onwards. In any case, all three series document a long run decline in the wage-rent ratio to the
mid-19th century and a secular recovery thereafter.
So Goes England, So Goes Europe?
As the first industrial country, and the dominant world economy of the 19
th century, the
English experience is clearly important in its own right. Still, it is worth asking whether this U-
shaped pattern traced out by the English wage-rent ratio over half a millennium was unique to
England. A similar wage-rent data base can also be constructed for France and the Netherlands
(Appendix 2). Figure 2 plots the three available series up to no later than 1750: the French wage-
rent ratio starts in 1450, and the Dutch and English ratios start in 1500. Figure 3 plots the three
available series up to no later than the eve of World War II. For all three countries, the wage-rent
ratio traces out a long run U-shaped pattern. In France the wage-rent ratio halved between 1450
and 1700, and almost halved again over the following century, before increasing sharply after
1800. In Holland there were ups and downs, but the overall trend was clearly downward between
1500 and roughly 1870, with an increase thereafter. 
Figure 2 shows that wage-rent ratio trends in the three countries correlate very well up to
1700 or so, and pairwise correlations for the years 1450 to 1700 confirm it. For England and
France (1565-1700) the correlation is 0.883; for England and Holland (1565-1700) it is 0.634; and for
France and Holland (1500-1700) it is 0.607. Figure 3 shows that the wage-rent correlations are even8
higher after 1850, and pairwise correlations for the years between 1850 and 1936 confirm it:
England-France (1850-1936) 0.865, England-Holland (1850-1914) 0.891, and France-Holland (1850-
1914) 0.949. 
Wage-rent ratio trends thus correlate very highly in western Europe during the two
subperiods 1500-1700 and 1850-1936, but the correlation collapses in between: for England and
France it is 0.033, for England and Holland it is 0.547, and for France and Holland it is 0.201. The
reason for the collapse is, of course, that the nadir of the wage-rent ratio U trend occurred at
different times (roughly speaking, 1800 in France, 1850 in Britain and 1870 in Holland), and the
magnitudes varied as well. Precocious England begins to experiment with modern economic
growth first and thus drifts away from lagging France and Holland in the 18
th century, but the
correlation between pre-industrial France and Holland remains fairly tight. By 1850, Holland and
France rejoin England and, as we have seen, wage-rent ratio trends conform again much like they
did prior to 1700. 
We conclude that the English, Dutch and French economies were obeying the same
economic laws of motion before 1700 and after 1850, but that different experiences with the
industrial revolution, globalization, or (in the French case) political upheaval produced different
trends in between.
3. Global Commodity Market Integration: The 19
th Century Was Different
Since we want to offer an explanation for the rise in wage-rent ratios after 1800 that
discriminates between industrialization and trade as potential causes, we need to be precise about1 There is, however, evidence of price convergence within the European continent, as noted
earlier.
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exactly when the European economies opened up to intercontinental trade. This section stresses
intercontinental trade, since it was the dramatically different factor endowments of the New
World that would eventually place European land rents under sustained pressure, and contribute
to the reversal in wage-rent ratios. Obviously within Europe there were regions of relative land
abundance and relative land scarcity, and the costs of trade between these regions had been
declining for several centuries. For example, David Jacks (2000) has documented substantial
commodity market integration across the North Sea and Baltic Sea between 1500 and 1800. But
no amount of trade with Prussia, for example, could have had the same impact on the British
economy, or on British factor prices, as trade with the Americas eventually did in the 19
th
century.
The costs of trading across frontiers will be reflected in price differentials for
homogenous goods in different markets, and a decline in these price differentials provides the
clearest indication of international commodity market integration. Prior to the 19
th century, there
is no systematic evidence of inter-continental price convergence.
1 For example, Figure 4 reports
data on price gaps between Amsterdam and Southeast Asia for three commodities -- cloves,
coffee and black pepper, important evidence when we remember that spices and pepper
combined were 68 percent of Dutch homeward cargoes in the mid-17
th century (Reid 1993: 288-
9). We have enough evidence to compute clove price gaps between Amsterdam and Maluku in
the Southeast Asian archipelago; the pepper price gap between Amsterdam and Southeast Asia
(in and around Sumatra); and the coffee price gap between Amsterdam and Java or Sumatra10
(Bulbeck, Reid, Tan and Wu 1998). Figure 4 plots price gaps or markups for the three
commodities, where these gaps or markups are defined as the ratio of the European to the Asian
price. There is plenty of evidence of price convergence for cloves from the 1590s to the 1640s,
but it was short-lived, since the spread soared to a 350-year high in the 1660s, maintaining that
high level during the Dutch East India Company monopoly and up to the 1770s. The clove price
spread fell steeply at the end of the French Wars, and by the 1820s was one-fourteenth of the
1730s level. This low spread was maintained across the 19
th century. Between the 1620s and the
1730s, the pepper price spread showed no trend, after which, however, it soared to a 250-year
high in the 1790s. By the 1820s, the pepper price spread of the early 17
th century was recovered,
and price convergence continued up to the 1880s, when the series ends. While there is some
evidence of price convergence for coffee during the half century between the 1730s and the
1780s, everything gained was lost during the French Wars. At the war’s end, price convergence
resumed, so that the coffee price spread in the 1850s was one-sixth of what it had been in the
1750s, and in the 1930s it was one-thirteenth of what it had been in the 1730s. In all three cases,
the story is the same: while substantial price convergence occurred after 1800, little or no price
convergence took place before. 
Similarly, there is no evidence that Anglo-Indian price convergence took place from the
mid-17
th to the mid-18
th century. In previous work (O’Rourke and Williamson 2002b: Figure 5)
we examine similar mark-up figures for the East India Company’s trade in pepper, saltpetre, tea,
raw silk, coffee, and indigo, between about 1660 and 1710. With the possible exception of
saltpetre, it would be very hard to establish a convincing case that mark-ups were declining
during this fifty-year period. Finally, we have also explored (ibid., Figure 6) the Anglo-Indian2 The British data are Gazette averages through 1980, and are taken from Mitchell (1988). After
1980, they are taken from the commodity price trends tables in the UK Annual Abstract of Statistics. The
US data for 1870-1913 are taken from O’Rourke (1997), where they are expressed in shillings per cwt;
onto these data are spliced the series in U.S. Department of Commerce (1975) for 1800-1870 and the US
Department of Agriculture series for 1914-1999 (http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/usda.html).
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trade in cloth, and the relationship between the average prices received by the East India
Company on its Asian textile sales in Europe, and the average prices it paid for those textiles in
Asia. Again, there is no sign of declining mark-ups (where mark-ups include all trade costs, as
well as any East India Company monopoly profits) over the century between 1664 and 1769.
Thus, the trade expansion between 1500 and 1800 appears to have been due to demand and
supply growth generated within the continents, not to commodity market integration between
them (O’Rourke and Williamson 2002a).
The 19
th century could not have been more different. Figure 4 shows rapid Dutch-Asian
price convergence for the 19
th century; Figure 5 provides similar evidence for another
commodity, wheat, and a different pair of countries, Britain and the US.
2 The price gap fluctuated
widely around an average of about 100 percent between 1800 and 1840, after which it fell
sharply, reaching negligible levels by the eve of World War I. Strikingly, the timing of this
decline in price differentials coincides with the timing of the sustained decline in ocean freight
rates documented by C. Knick Harley (1988), and supports his view that it was the new transport
technologies of the 19
th century that were crucial in revolutionizing world trade, rather than the
institutional factors stressed by Douglass North (1958), which had been in operation from an
earlier date. The evidence of Figure 5 could be replicated many times over: by the late 19
th
century it is difficult to find commodities and pairs of markets for which there is no evidence of3 Continental European grain markets protected by defensive tariffs provide one exception in the
late 19
th century: see O’Rourke (1997). Defensive protection against an invasion of European
manufactures was even greater in Latin and North America, but it did not overturn the forces of global
integration caused by transport improvements (Clemens and Williamson 2002; Coatsworth and
Williamson 2002).
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powerful commodity market integration.
3 To take just three examples, London-Cincinnati
percentage price differentials for bacon fell from 92.5 percent in 1870 to 17.9 percent in 1913 ;
Liverpool-Bombay price differentials for cotton fell from 57 percent in 1873 to 20 percent in
1913; and London-Rangoon price differentials for rice fell from 93 to 26 percent over the same
period (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999: 43-53). Commodity market integration during the
century before World War I was a genuinely worldwide phenomenon, and it was immense.
 4. What Determined English Commodity and Factor Prices Prior to 1750?
If sustained global commodity market integration only began in the 19
th century then it
follows that the distributional implications of international trade should only have begun to
manifest themselves some time between Waterloo and the Great War. In order to test this
hypothesis we gathered data on English factor endowments, commodity prices, productivity and
factor prices from 1500 to 1936. For these four centuries, we were able to construct: the ratio of
agricultural land to the economy-wide labor supply (LANDLAB); the ratio of agricultural prices
to industrial prices (PAPM); the ratio of wage rates to farm land rents (WR); total factor
productivity in agriculture (TFPAG); and labor productivity in manufacturing (INDPROD). The
sources of these English data are described in Appendix 1.
Is it the case that English commodity prices were more closely linked to English13
endowments prior to the 19
th century? And if so, when did this traditional (closed economy)
relationship break down? Figure 6 explores the question of when the structural break took place:
it assumes a simple log-linear relationship between relative commodity prices, PAPM, and the
land-labor ratio LANDLAB, and plots Chow test statistics for every year between 1502 and 1935
to see where a structural break in this relationship is most likely to have taken place. There is a
slow, hardly noticeable rise in the test statistic between 1500 and 1700, followed by a significant
rise from 1700 to 1750, and a larger rise from 1750 to 1800. This timing coincides well with
what we know about the gradual opening of the English economy to international trade during
the course of the 18
th century: for example, the share of exports in national income rose from
8.4% in 1700 to 14.6% in 1760 and 15.7% in 1801 (Crafts 1985: Table 6.6, 131). The figure
suggests that traditional links between relative commodity prices and endowments were already
breaking down during this century; however, the sharpest acceleration in the test statistic occurs
between about 1800 and 1840. Figure 6 indicates that the best candidate for a structural break is
the second quarter of the 19
th century, with the peak in the series occurring in 1838. Strikingly,
this 1838 peak in Figure 6 is very similar to the timing of decline in both the Harley freight index
and the UK-US grain price gap. Furthermore, it is consistent with qualitative accounts regarding
the liberalization of  trade policy which have long been a staple in the economic history
literature. That is, the two decades or so after 1815 were full of pro-globalization policy changes.
Prior to 1828, grain imports were prohibited if domestic prices fell below a certain ‘port-closing’
level, and during the early postwar years grain imports were effectively excluded much of the
time. In 1828, the Duke of Wellington’s government replaced these import restrictions with
tariffs which varied with the domestic price, a policy that not only lowered British grain prices14
but also increased the integration of British and Continental grain markets. Moreover, this
adoption of the sliding scale tariff came at the end of a decade which had seen several other
moves towards freer trade: a reform of the Navigation Acts in 1822; tariff reductions across the
board; and the repeal of more than 1,100 tariff acts in 1825, the year in which the emigration of
skilled workers was once again authorized. Of course, prior to 1815 the French Wars had
severely restricted international trade (Findlay and O’Rourke 2001). In short, by 1838 there had
already been a radical liberalization of British commercial policy (Williamson 1990), and Britain
stuck with that pro-globalization policy stance up to the more famous 1846 Repeal of the Corn
Laws and beyond.
Table 1 estimates a simple log-linear regression of PAPM on LANDLAB for the initial,
closed economy period, which we take to be 1500-1750. In principle, rising land-labor ratios
should have pushed up food supply relative to food demand, and lowered the relative price of
food: the coefficient on LANDLAB should thus be negative, which it is. Moreover, the
regression passes standard Engle-Granger cointegration tests at the 10 percent level. Figure 7
plots the natural logarithm of PAPM, and of its predicted value generated by this regression
(labeled PAPMF). Thus, PAPMF represents the relative price of agricultural goods that would
have prevailed had they continued to be determined by domestic endowments after 1750. Since
land-labor ratios continued to decline in Britain after 1750, the regression predicts that the
relative price of food should have continued to rise. But in fact it stopped rising somewhere
around the middle of the 19
th century, and then started to decline. Table 1 does a very good job of
predicting the behavior of PAPM prior to the middle of the 18
th century, but Figure 7 shows that
it does a very poor job after the beginning or middle of the 19
th century -- consistent with the4 The relationship is at the margins of cointegration, passing the Engle-Granger test at the 15
percent level.
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hypothesis that commodity prices became uncoupled from domestic endowments by the mid-
19th century, and were determined on world markets thereafter.
How were wage-rent ratios determined in pre-19
th century England? In a closed economy
without trade, a decline in land-labor ratios should lead to a fall in the wage-rent ratio, and for
standard Malthusian reasons. Rising industrial productivity, due either to rising capital-labor
ratios or to better industrial technology, should raise wage-rent ratios, for reasons stated earlier.
The impact of better agricultural technology on wage-rent ratios should depend on whether it was
labor-saving or land-saving. Table 2 gives the results of regressing the wage-rent ratio (WR) on
endowments (LANDLAB), on industrial productivity (INDPROD), and on agricultural
productivity (TFPAG), for the years 1500-1750.
4 (Once again, all variables are expressed in
natural logarithms.) As expected, the wage-rent ratio was positively related to the land-labor
ratio. It was also positively related to industrial productivity. However, it was negatively related
to agricultural productivity, suggesting that technical change in early modern English agriculture
tended to be labor-saving, or land-using, which is what socialist critics of the enclosure
movement have long maintained (Marx 1867; Hammond and Hammond 1932; Dobb 1946), an
assertion that has been supported by recent empirical analysis (Allen 1992: Chp. 11).
Table 3 uses these results to decompose changes in the wage-rent ratio into those
components which were due to changes in LANDLAB, TFPAG and INDPROD. Panel A reports
the actual changes in these variables between 1500 and 1750. Panel B then uses the coefficients
from Table 2 to derive the change in the wage-rent ratio due to changes in each of these three16
exogenous variables and an unexplained residual. These impact estimates are all expressed as
percentages of the actual change in WR. Thus, the first row of panel B shows that 53.2 percent of
the 16
th century decline in wage-rent ratios was due to falling land-labor ratios; 19.5 percent was
due to improved agricultural labor-saving technology; and 28.5 percent was due to a decline in
industrial productivity; leaving very little unexplained by the residual. Over the period as a
whole, the dominant factors pushing down the wage-rent ratio were a rising population and
improvements in agricultural technology: according to the final row of panel B, 74.5 percent of
the decline in wage-rent ratios in the quarter millennium after Columbus was due to falling land-
labor ratios, while 38.5 percent was due to improvements in agricultural total factor productivity.
Falling industrial productivity between 1500 and 1600 reinforced those trends, but rising
industrial productivity from 1600 onwards served to counter them: over the period as a whole,
changing industrial productivity had little impact on changing wage-rent ratios. Residual forces,
unaccounted for by the regression in Table 2, served to lower the wage-rent ratio, but those
forces were not very powerful over the quarter millennium as a whole. However, those residual
forces certainly rose over time. Indeed, the very large residual which finally appears between
1700 and 1750 signals that these closed-economy, pre-industrial relationships were already
breaking down in the first half of the 18
th century. Still, the main message emerging from Table 3
is that population pressure on the land was crucial in explaining the collapse in the wage-rent
ratio before 1750, an empirical finding fully consistent with a characterization of the epoch as
‘Malthusian’.17
5. What Determined Factor Prices After 1840?
Figure 8 displays the central fact motivating this paper. The predicted WR in the figure is
the natural logarithm of the wage-rent ratio which the pre-1750 relationship estimated in Table 2
implies for the full 450 years after Columbus: that is to say, it takes the regression coefficients
estimated in Table 2, and applies these to the actual movements in LANDLAB, TFPAG and
INDPROD over the entire period. From 1750 on it thus represents a counterfactual WR series
which would have obtained had there been no fundamental regime change. If pre-industrial
relationships had been sustained, the wage-rent ratio would have continuously declined
throughout, and at a much more rapid rate in the 19
th century than before. Panel C of Table 3
reports the change in this counterfactual wage-rent ratio series (WRCF) between 1750 and 1936,
as well as the actual changes in the exogenous variables which are driving the counterfactual
series. Panel D then decomposes the change in the counterfactual series into the components
explained by changes in each of the three exogenous variables. Declining land-labor ratios
explain almost the entire decline in the counterfactual series (93 percent); more rapid
technological progress in agriculture also helps push down counterfactual wage-rent ratios (40
percent), but this agricultural productivity effect is almost entirely offset by the impact of even
more rapid improvements in industrial productivity (-33 percent).
If there had been no fundamental change in regime, 19
th century wage-rent ratios would
have continued to decline rapidly, but this is not at all what happened. On the contrary, Figure 8
shows that the wage-rent ratio actually declined at a far more sedate pace until 1850 or so, before
turning around and increasing markedly. What explains this dramatic departure from the5 O’Rourke and Williamson (2002c) show that while closed economy models similar to the one
estimated earlier work well before 1800, they do not work at all well from the 19
th century on. Similarly,
open economy models work well for the later period, but not for the earlier one.
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historical norm? Was it the industrial revolution, which pulled workers into the cities at an
accelerating pace, thus raising wage-rent ratios? Or was it the growing internationalization of the
British economy, effectively raising Britain’s land-labor ratio by importing land-intensive
foodstuffs and manufacturing intermediates (e.g. cotton, wool and timber) produced on more
abundant land overseas? Or was it both?
Table 4 estimates a (log-linear) open-economy model of the wage-rent ratio over the
period 1840-1936.
5 This period was chosen since the previous two sections suggested that it was
only after the late 1830s that the transition from a relatively closed economy to a relatively open
one, in which relative commodity prices were effectively delinked from domestic endowments,
was complete. In an open economy, WR could still be a function of INDPROD, TFPAG and
LANDLAB (assuming that the number of factors exceeds the number of traded goods), but it
should also be a function of relative commodity prices PAPM, which are now taken as
exogenous in a newly globalized world. The specific factors trade model predicts that as the
relative price of food declines, resources should be transferred out of agriculture, and land rents
(returns to the immobile factor) should fall relative to wages (returns to the mobile factor): thus
WR should be a negative function of PAPM.  TFPAG and LANDLAB are omitted from the
regression since when equations were estimated including them, the coefficients on TFPAG and
LANDLAB were statistically insignificant, and the equations failed Engle-Granger cointegration tests.
We are thus left with a parsimonious specification in which the wage-rent ratio is a function of
industrial productivity and relative commodity prices alone. As Table 4 shows, WR was again6 We use the word “globalization” to denote a rise in trade driven by commodity market
integration. It does not include the effect of globalization on labor markets carried by mass migration
(Hatton and Williamson 1998) or on capital markets carried by the great capital export from Europe
(Obstfeld and Taylor 2002). After all, these factor market effects are already embedded in LANDLAB
and INDPROD.
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positively related to industrial productivity, and the estimated coefficient is almost exactly the
same as that found in Table 2 for 1500-1750 (i.e. 1.02). Furthermore, WR was negatively related
to the relative price of agricultural goods, just as trade theory suggests. The equation passes the
Engle-Granger cointegration test at the 5 percent level.
Panel E of Table 3 reports the actual changes in WR, INDPROD and PAPM between
1840 and 1936, while Panel F decomposes the change in WR into those portions due to changing
industrial productivity and changing relative prices. From the results in Panel F it might appear
that the industrial revolution was the dominant actor in the story, while globalization was only a
bit player. After all, the rise in industrial productivity accounted for all of the rise in the wage-
rent ratio after 1840, while falling relative agricultural prices accounted for “only” a fifth of the
rise (and the impact of PAPM was almost precisely offset by residual factors). However, this
decomposition is a grossly inaccurate reflection of the impact on factor prices of Britain opening
up to intercontinental trade between the 1820s and 1840s, since the decomposition measures the
impact of changing commodity prices relative to an implicit counterfactual of no change in
relative commodity prices. In fact, the appropriate no-trade counterfactual is one of a continued
rise in relative agricultural prices (Figure 7), and it is against that counterfactual that the impact
of the regime switch to openness should be gauged.
Figure 9 supplies a far more accurate accounting of the relative impact of globalization
6
and the industrial revolution in explaining the turn-about in wage-rent trends after the 1830s. It7 In fact, several papers in this literature (e.g. Galor and Weil 2000, Jones 2001 and Galor and
Mountford 2002) assume that returns to land are zero for reasons of analytical tractability.
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reports the actual behavior of the wage-rent ratio from 1840 onwards (based on fitted values from
the regression in Table 4) and the “predicted” wage-rent ratio which would have applied had pre-
1750 relationships continued to hold (based on fitted values from the regression in Table 2).
While the wage-rent ratio in fact increased more than four-fold over the period, it would have
declined by more than 80 percent had it continued to evolve according to pre-1750 relationships.
The figure also plots three counterfactual wage-rent ratio series. The first, labeled ‘no industrial
revolution,’ is again based on the estimated equation in Table 4, but holds the level of industrial
productivity constant in every year (at its 1840 level). Thus, it shows the wage-rent ratios which
would have obtained had relative commodity prices evolved in the way they did, but had there
been no improvement in industrial productivity from 1840 onwards. As can be seen, if there had
been no increase in industrial productivity over that century, the wage-rent ratio would have
remained roughly constant throughout -- rising by a mere 29 percent by 1936, rather than
recording an actual increase of 354 percent. Presumably, this is the channel of causation -- from
the industrial revolution to rising wage-rent ratios -- which would have been favored by Jones,
Galor and Weil, Lucas and other theorists, had they addressed this relative factor price issue
explicitly.
7 
The second series, labeled ‘no trade,’ also uses the coefficients which were estimated in
Table 4. It assumes that the English economy remained relatively closed to international trade,
and, to be more precise, that relative commodity prices continued to be determined by domestic
factor endowments after the 1830s. This counterfactual thus allows INDPROD to evolve as it21
did, but substitutes the counterfactual PAPMF series in Figure 7 for the actual PAPM series. As
can be seen from Figure 9, if there had been no open economy forces causing relative commodity
prices to diverge from their historical trajectory the wage-rent ratio would have remained
relatively constant between 1840 and 1936, increasing by a mere 59 percent, rather than by 354
percent as actually occurred. Figure 9 suggests that globalization and the industrial revolution
had roughly equal effects on wage-rent ratios throughout this period: the two counterfactual
series are remarkably close to each other. Finally, the ‘no industrial revolution & no trade’ series
holds INDPROD constant as before, and also substitutes PAPMF for PAPM as in the ‘no trade’
counterfactual. In this final counterfactual, the wage-rent ratio actually falls by 55 percent
between 1840 and 1936, and at almost the same rate as if pre-1750 relationships had been
maintained.
We conclude two things from these counterfactuals. First, industrial revolutionary forces
and the opening up of the English economy to trade together explain the historic reversal in long-
run wage-rent ratio trends. If industrial productivity had failed to increase, and if relative
commodity prices had continued to evolve as they had done prior to 1750, then the wage-rent
ratio would have continued to decline after the 1830s as they had since 1500, and by a substantial
amount. However, once INDPROD and PAPM are allowed to evolve as they actually did, our
econometric model replicates the actual rise in wage-rent ratios which took place between 1840
and 1936. Second, and just as important, while the long-run turnaround in wage-rent ratio trends
can be explained partly by industrial revolutionary forces, it is also explained by the open
economy forces identified long ago by Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin. Comparing the ‘no trade’
and ‘no industrial revolution’ series in Figure 9, it would appear that trade was just as important22
as industrial revolutionary forces in explaining the historic relative factor price turn-around. A
closed economy account of the revolutionary change in growth and distribution performance
during the 19
th century misses half the story.
6. The Transition, 1750-1840
We have argued that there were not one but two regime switches which occurred in
Britain during the late 18
th and early 19
th centuries. The first was a transition to modern industrial
growth and the second was a transition towards a more open trading environment. It is important
to note that these regime switches were not abrupt, but rather took place over a number of
decades. Furthermore, a number of economic historians have argued that these two transitions
were intimately related to each other.
Traditional economic history has always taught that the Industrial Revolution marked a
sharp and “revolutionary” discontinuity. The older evidence seemed to support this view; for
example, Walther Hoffmann’s (1955) data show a dramatic acceleration of industrial output after
1770. More recent work, however, has found that aggregate growth and technical change were
much slower between 1770 and 1830 than had been previously thought (e.g. Crafts and Harley
1992), with technical change largely concentrated in a number of key industries. Moreover, the
aggregate growth rate had been steadily increasing since the beginning of the 18
th century. Thus,
“the origins of modern economic growth extended over a longer time period and a wider
geographical area than are traditionally encompassed in studies of the Industrial Revolution”
(Harley and Crafts 2000: 820-21). Furthermore, there is another tradition that focuses on pre-8 Of course, much of this rise in the trade share was due to rising demand generated by successful
economic growth, rather than to globalization (O’Rourke and Williamson 2002a).
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factory cottage industry development, so-called proto-industrialization. This recent scholarship
has encouraged some to discard the phrase “industrial revolution” entirely!
While the price gap evidence outlined in section 3 certainly documents a stark contrast –
no intercontinental price convergence before 1800, but substantial price convergence thereafter –
it is important to note that the move to a more open British economy had also been taking place
over a long period. To repeat, the share of exports in British national output gradually rose from
8.4% in 1700 to 14.6% in 1760, 15.7% in 1801, and 19.6% in 1851 (Crafts 1985: Table 6.6,
131).
8 Furthermore, the role of intercontinental trade was also increasing throughout the 18
th and
early 19
th centuries: Europe took 85.3% of English exports in 1700-1, but only 77% in 1750-1,
49.2% in 1772-3, and 30.1% in 1797-8. The Americas (the source of abundant land) were the
most important overseas destination, with their share of total exports rising from 10.3% to 57.4%
over the same period (O’Brien and Engerman 1991: Table 4, 186). Figure 6 indicated that
traditional “Malthusian” relationships between English prices and endowments were already
breaking down during the 18
th century, consistent with this gradual opening of the economy.
True, wars continuously served to interrupt the contribution of long run fundamentals pushing
international commodity market integration. For example, Figure 4 indicates a spike in the clove
price gap which coincided with the Seven Years War (1756-63), and an increase in coffee and
black pepper price gaps during the 1790s which coincided with the outbreak of the French and
Napoleonic Wars. The pax Britannica that prevailed after Waterloo allowed those fundamentals
to exert their full impact. These included the technological breakthroughs in transport which9 For a recent survey of the historiography, see Morgan (2000). Economists have had an equally
lively debate as they have tried to disentangle the late 20
th century impact of globalization on growth and
inequality. 
24
were crucial in driving down freight rates so dramatically in the 19
th century (Harley 1988).
Finally, the two revolutions which we argue were responsible for reversing the long run
decline in wage-rent ratios were connected in a number of ways -- although the precise nature of
these links remains a subject of lively debate.
9 Most obviously, the innovations which drove
down freight rates – notably the metal steamship – depended on the steam engine and
developments in metallurgy which together constituted some of the most notable technological
breakthroughs of the Industrial Revolution. But the causation may also have gone the other way
around, from trade to the Industrial Revolution. While it is clear that the industrial revolution was
supply-driven, and that export demand was therefore not the cause of it in any old-fashioned
Keynesian sense (Mokyr 1977), and while Marxist accounts of the industrial revolution, which
link British accumulation to profits derived from the colonial trade, do not withstand scrutiny
either (O’Brien 1982), it is difficult to imagine that English industrial growth between 1750 and
1850 would have been as rapid as it was in fact without ample and elastic supplies of imported
raw materials such as cotton, and the ability to sell industrial output in overseas markets (Findlay
1982, 1990; O’Brien and Engerman 1991). Overseas markets were in fact more important for
industry than for the economy as a whole: the export share in gross industrial output was 24.4%
in 1700, and 34.4% in 1801 (O’Brien and Engerman 1991: 188). Between 1780 and 1801, the
increase in industrial exports was 46.2% of the increase in gross industrial output; in 1801,
exports were 24% of iron output, and an astonishing 62% of cotton output.  While no scholar has
quantified what would have happened to British investment incentives had industrialists been25
forced to sell their output solely on domestic markets, and source all their raw materials
domestically, the direction of the effect seems obvious. Without trade, the prices of manufactures
would have declined by more than they actually did, and manufacturing inputs would have been
far more expensive. Thus, profitability and (presumably) investment would have been lower
(especially given that textile fibers such as wool were less easily mechanized than raw cotton,
making a counterfactual switch from imported cotton to domestic wool very difficult).
Furthermore, an elastic supply of raw cotton to the British economy required not only elastic
supplies of New World land, but elastic supplies of slave labor as well. Thus, the British
Industrial Revolution was intimately bound up with the Triangular Trade linking Africa, Europe
and the Americas (Findlay 1990).
7. Conclusion
This paper has provided evidence of a dramatic structural break in European long run
relative factor price trends which coincided with the more familiar break which occurred in
living standards and aggregate productivity behavior. If the English wage-rent ratio had
continued to follow the same laws of motion after 1750 as before it would have declined
continuously throughout the modern period, and at an accelerating rate as population growth
increased and the land-labor ratio fell ever more dramatically. Instead, it declined briefly and
moderately until it started its modern rise sometime around 1850.
We have argued that this reversal in wage-rent ratio trends was due not only to the
industrial revolution, but to the opening of the English economy to trade. Evidence on falling26
transport costs, rising liberal policy, evaporating international commodity price gaps, rising trade
shares, and the relationship between commodity prices and factor endowments all suggest that
the English economy became much more open to trade during the 18
th and early 19
th centuries,
and particularly during the quarter century or so after Waterloo. By the middle of the 19
th century
relative commodity prices no longer evolved as if they were determined by English factor
endowments; relative agricultural prices stopped their secular rise, and eventually even started to
decline. We have shown that trade was just as important as rising industrial productivity in
explaining the reversal in wage-rent ratio trends after 1840. Factor price ratios would not have
increased dramatically in the absence of industrial revolutionary forces; nor would they have
increased dramatically had relative commodity prices continued to be determined by domestic
factor endowments, as they had been for the quarter millennium prior to 1750 and even longer.
It is certainly true that standard (static) models predict that trade will have a larger impact
on relative factor prices than on average living standards. Nonetheless, our results caution against
any attempt to explain the shift away from a Malthusian regime to a modern growth regime by
use of closed economy thinking alone. Indeed, this paper probably understates the importance of
trade in producing regime shifts during this period, since it ignores the possibility that the
industrial revolution may itself have been intimately connected with the development of
international trade during the 18
th and early 19
th centuries. Without the possibility of
intercontinental trade, industrial productivity would almost certainly not have increased by as
much as it actually did during the industrial revolution: trade may not have kick-started the First10 Indeed, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) have offered new evidence recently that
participation in the Atlantic economy was essential in making modern Western European growth possible
before 1850.
11 The third “only” in this sentence is there to stress that there was no world globalization after
Columbus until mercantilism broke down sometime in the transitional 18
th century (O’Rourke and
Williamson 2002b).
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Industrial Revolution, but it surely played an indispensable supporting role.
10 Open economy
forces must have played an even more important role after 1750 than our already-impressive
econometric results suggest.
Our findings are consistent with a vast economic history literature which emphasizes the
role of the Atlantic economy (most recently, Acemoglu et al. 2002), and the many economic
interactions between Europe and the rest of the world, in explaining Europe’s take-off in the late
18
th and 19
th centuries. They are also consistent with a long-standing tradition in economic
history of viewing the Voyages of Discovery as providing Europe with a crucial resource
windfall and easing Malthusian constraints – but only after New World land had been brought
into cultivation, and only after transport technology had progressed to the point where the output
of that land could be cheaply carried back to Europe (Jones 1981; Pomeranz 2000), and only after
liberal policies and institutions allowed the trade to take place.
11 Our findings are inconsistent
with the many closed economy models used by theorists to explain Europe’s take-off into
sustainable modern economic growth. True, some of the theorists cited early in this paper
recognize the limitations of their closed economy assumptions. For example, in their concluding
speculations Galor and Weil state “that the inflow of grain and other commodities as well as the
outflow of migrants during the nineteenth century may have played a crucial role in Europe’s
development. By easing the land constraint at a crucial point – when income per capita had28
begun to rise rapidly, but before the demographic transition had gotten under way – the “ghost
acres” of the New World provided a window of time, which allowed Europe to pull decisively
away from the Malthusian equilibrium” (Galor and Weil 2000: p. 826).  It is our contention that
these open economy forces deserve far more than a footnote. Indeed, they should get equal
billing with closed economy industrial revolutionary forces in any model of long run growth over
the past two centuries.29
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Economic History 27, 2 (April): 123-56.Table 1. Explaining Relative Commodity Prices, 1500-1750
(Dependent Variable: PAPM)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 8.37 0.10 86.98 0.00 
LANDLAB -0.76 0.01 -53.20 0.00 
R-squared 0.919 Mean dependent var 3.256
Adjusted R-squared 0.919 S.D. dependent var 0.222
S.E. of regression 0.063 Akaike info criterion -2.676
Sum squared resid 0.996 Schwarz criterion -2.648
Log likelihood 337.837 F-statistic 2830.276
Durbin-Watson stat 0.017 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
   Source: See textTable 2. Explaining Wage-Rent Ratios, 1500-1750
(Dependent Variable: WR)
Variable Coef. Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -2.190016 1.850914 -1.183208  0.2379 
LANDLAB 1.663841 0.162203 10.25779  0.0000 
TFPAG -1.965769 0.312101 -6.298505  0.0000 
INDPROD 1.021139 0.141353 7.224027  0.0000 
R-squared 0.940723  Mean dependent var 5.167565 
Adjusted R-squared 0.940003  S.D. dependent var 0.760859 
S.E. of regression 0.186366  Akaike info criterion -0.506396 
Sum squared resid 8.578912  Schwarz criterion -0.450214 
Log likelihood 67.55272  F-statistic 1306.634 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.05314  Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
   Source: See text.Table 3. Decomposing Changes in Wage-Rent Ratios, 1500-1936
Panel A. Actual movements in variables 1500-1750 (change in log)
WR LANDLAB TFPAG INDPROD
1500-1600 -1.7 -0.5 0.2 -0.5
1600-1700 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.3
1700-1750 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1
1500-1750 -1.9 -0.9 0.4 -0.1
Panel B. Explaining movements in WR 1500-1750  (percent accounted for)
TOTAL LANDLAB TFPAG INDPROD RESIDUAL
1500-1600 100.0 53.2 19.5 28.5 -1.1
1600-1700 100.0 143.9 103.5 -131.6 -15.8
1700-1750 100.0 421.4 335.2 -183.0 -473.7
1500-1750 100.0 74.5 38.5 2.7 -15.7
Panel C. Counterfactual change in WR and actual movements in other variables 
1750-1936 (change in log)
WRCF LANDLAB TFPAG INDPROD
1750-1936 -3.9 -2.2 0.8 1.3
Panel D. Explaining movements in counterfactual WR 1840-1936
(percent accounted for)
WRCF LANDLAB TFPAG INDPROD
1750-1936 100.0 93.0 40.1 -33.1 0.0
Panel E. Actual movements in variables 1840-1936 (change in log)
WR INDPROD PAPM
1840-1936 1.2 1.2 -0.3
Panel F. Explaining movements in WR 1840-1936 (percent accounted for)
TOTAL INDPROD PAPM RESIDUAL
1840-1936 100.0 101.6 20.8 -22.5
      Source: See text.Table 4. Explaining Wage-Rent Ratios, 1840-1936
(Dependent Variable: WR)
Variable Coef. Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 3.955426 1.199848 3.296605  0.0014 
INDPROD 1.019983 0.064368 15.84601  0.0000 
PAPM -0.85516 0.221852  -3.854637  0.0002 
R-squared 0.823835  Mean dependent var 4.508884 
Adjusted R-squared 0.820087  S.D. dependent var 0.439814 
S.E. of regression 0.186552  Akaike info criterion -0.489771 
Sum squared resid 3.271363  Schwarz criterion -0.410141 
Log likelihood 26.75392  F-statistic 219.796 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.289086  Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
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Figure 1. English wage-rental ratio
1500-1936, 1900=100
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Figure 2. European wage-rent ratios
1450-1750, 1500=100
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Figure 3. European wage-rent ratios
1750-1939, 1750=100
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Figure 4. Spice and coffee markups:
Amsterdam vs. Southeast Asia 1580-1939







































































Figure 5. GB-US wheat price gaps
percent, 3-yr. moving average
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Figure 6. Chow test statistics
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Figure 7. Actual and predicted PAPM
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Figure 8. Actual & predicted w/r
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Figure 9. Actual & counterfactual w/r
1840-1936
Source: see text.Appendix 1
 
English Wages, Land Rents, Inter-Sectoral Terms of Trade, Land-Labor Ratios 
and Sectoral Productivity 1500-1936
Nominal Agricultural Wages 1500-1936 (1900=100)
1500-1670: male day wages in agriculture, pence per day; reported decadal, interpolated
geometrically to get annual; from G. Clark, “The Long March of History: Farm Laborers’ Wages
in England 1208-1850,” mimeo, University of California, Davis (n.d.), Table 4, p. 26.
1670-1851: “Winter” farm wages, pence per day; annual; from G. Clark, “Farm Wages and
Living Standards in the Industrial Revolution: England, 1670-1850,” Economic History Review
54, 3 (August 2001), pp. 477-505.
1851-1902: average weekly cash wages of ordinary laborers paid 67 farms in England and Wales,
shillings per week; annual; from A. Wilson Fox, “Agricultural Wages in England and Wales
During the Last Fifty Years,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 66, 2 (1903), pp. 273-359
and Appendix II, pp. 331-2.
1902-1914: Bowley and Wood’s index of average agricultural wages, England and Wales,  in a
normal week; annual index (1891=100); taken from B. R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 158-9; original source: A. L. Bowley,
Wages and Income Since 1860 (Cambridge: 1937).
1914-1920: weekly wage rate in agriculture, England and Wales, in July; annual index (July
1914=100); taken from Mitchell (1988), p. 160; original source: A. L. Bowley, Prices and Wages
in the United Kingdom, 1914-1920 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921).
1920-1936: weekly wage rate in agriculture, England and Wales; annual index (1924=100); taken
from Mitchell (1988), p. 160; original source: E. C. Ramsbottom, “The Course of Wage Rates in
the United Kingdom, 1921-34,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society XCVIII (1935) and
similar article for 1934-7 in ibid..
 
Nominal Farm Land Rents 1500-1936 (1900=100)
Index A:
1500-1831: land rental values, England average, £/acre; from G. Clark, “Land Rental Values and
the Agrarian Economy: England and Wales, 1500-1912,” European Review of Economic History
(forthcoming  2002), Table 8; values are given for 1500-39 (taken to be 1520), 1540-59 (1550),
1560-79 (1570) and 1580-99 (1590); reported by decade for the 17
th century; reported at 5 yearly
intervals from 1700 onwards; interpolated geometrically to get annual; rents are assumed
constant from 1500-1520, in line with the data on land and farmhouse rental values in G. Clark,
“The Secret History of the Industrial Revolution,” mimeo, October 2001, Table 2, p. 15.; and
also in line with the data in R. C. Allen, “The Price of Freehold Land and the Interest Rate in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” Economic History Review XLI, 1 (February 1988), pp.
33-50, discussed below under Index C.
1831-1870: annual; from J. Thompson, “An Inquiry into the Rent of Agricultural Land in
England and Wales during the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,
LXX (December 1907), Appendix, Table A, p. 612.1871-1900: annual; an unweighted average of Thompson (1907) and H. A. Rhee, The Rent of
Agricultural Land in England and Wales (London: Central Landowners Association, 1949),
Appendix Table 2, pp. 44-5.
1900-1936: annual; Rhee (1949).
Index B:
Alternative index 1690-1914: annual; linked forwards and backwards to the rest of Index A
above: M. E. Turner, J. V. Beckett, and B. Afton, Agricultural Rent in England 1690-1914
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Appendix Table A2.2, pp. 314-8.
Index C:
1500-1831: South Midlands average rent, shillings per acre; by quarter century, interpolated
geometrically; taken from Allen (1988), Table 2, p. 43.
1831-1936: as Index A above; annual.
Inter-Sectoral Terms of Trade, Pa/Pm (1900=100): Pa 1316-1938
1316-1450: Exeter wheat; annual; from B. R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract of British
Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 484-6.
1450-1649: “average - all agricultural products,” including grains, other arable crops, livestock
and animal products; reported decadal, interpolated geometrically to get annual; from J. Thirsk
(ed.), The Agrarian History of England and Wales, Volume IV: 1500-1640 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1967), Table XIII, p. 862.
1640-1749: “average - all agricultural products,” including grains, other field crops, livestock and
animal products; reported decadal, interpolated geometrically to get annual; from J. Thirsk (ed.),
The Agrarian History of England and Wales, Volume V: 1640-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), Table XII, p. 856.
1749-1805: wheat; reported decadal, interpolated geometrically to get annual; from P. Deane and
W. A. Cole, British Economic Growth 1688-1959, 2
nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1962),Table 23, p. 91.
1805-1913: total agricultural products; annual; from Mitchell and Deane (1962), pp. 471-3.
1913-1938: total food; annual; from Mitchell and Deane (1962), p. 475.
Inter-Sectoral Terms of Trade, Pa/Pm (1900=100): Pm 1450-1938 
1450-1649: “industrial products”; reported decadal, interpolated geometrically to get annual;
from Thirsk (1967), Table XIII, p. 862.
1640-1749: “industrial products”; reported decadal, interpolated geometrically to get annual;
from Thirsk (1985), Table XII, p. 856.
1740-1796: “other prices” (equals unweighted average of Schumpeter’s producer goods); annual;
from Deane and Cole (1962), Table 23, p. 91.
1796-1938: price indices of merchandise exports (equals Imlah and Board of Trade, linked on
1913); from Mitchell and Deane (1962), pp. 331-2.Land/Labor Ratios (1900=100): Total Economy-Wide Labor Force 1500-1940
Post-1840:
1841-1951: “total occupied,” males and females; reported for census dates, interpolated
geometrically to get annual (including the missing years 1932-1936); from Mitchell and Deane
(1962), pp. 60-1.
Pre-1841:
Labor force or population age distribution estimates do not exist for the period prior to the late
18
th century. Thus, we simply link the population totals up to 1841 with the economy-wide labor
force totals 1841-1936 (e.g., we assume the 1841 labor participation rate was constant between
1560 and 1840, and at the 1841 rate).
Population 1541-1841: England; annual; from E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield, The
Population History of England, 1541-1871 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
Table A3.3, pp. 531-4.
Population 1500-1541: assumes that growth was at the rate suggested by Wrigley and Schofield
(1981), p. 737.
Land/Labor Ratios (1900=100): Land in Agriculture 1500-1940
Post-1866:
1867-1936: acreage in crops; Great Britain; annual: from Mitchell and Deane (1962), pp. 78-9.
Pre-1867:
In his seminal piece on population in pre-industrial England, Ronald D. Lee (“Population in
Preindustrial England: An Econometric Analysis,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, 4,
November 1973: 581-607) quotes Postan to justify his assumption of a constant farm land
endowment: “By 1066 the occupation of England by the English had gone far enough to have
brought into cultivation ... most of the area known to have been occupied in later centuries of
English history.” (M. M. Postan, “Medieval Agrarian Society in Its Prime,” in H. J. Habakkuk
and M. M. Postan (eds.), Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Volume I (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1966; 2
nd ed.), Chapter VII, Part 7, pp. 567-8. We make the same
assumption.
Manufacturing Productivity (1900=100)
1869-1936: Manufacturing output divided by manufacturing employment; annual (with
interpolations between 1913 and 1920); taken from S. N. Broadberry, The Productivity Race:
British Manufacturing in International Perspective, 1850-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), Appendix 3, pp. 42-4.
1700-1869: Industrial production divided by industrial labor force. Industrial production taken
from N. F. R. Crafts and C. K. Harley, “Output Growth and the British Industrial Revolution: A
Restatement of the Crafts-Harley View,” Economic History Review XLV, 4 (November 1992),
pp. 703-30, ‘revised best guess’, Table A3.1, pp. 725-7; annual. Industrial labor force based on
applying estimates of the industrial share of the labor force to the annual labor force estimates
above. N. F. R. Crafts, British Economic Growth During the Industrial Revolution (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1985), Table 3.6, pp. 62-3, gives estimates of the industrial share of the male
labor force for 1700, 1760, 1800, 1840 and 1870. Data for intervening years are generated by
geometric interpolation. The procedure assumes that the industrial share of the female labor force
was similar to that of the male labor force.
1500-1700: Non-agricultural output divided by non-agricultural labor force. Based on data given
in Clark (October 2001). Data on nominal GDP are taken from his Table 3, pp. 19-20, and are
deflated using the GDP deflator in his Table 7, pp. 30-31. Real GDP is then divided into its
agricultural and non-agricultural components by assuming that these are proportional to the wage
bills in the two sectors (which is equivalent to assuming that the ratio of the average products in
the two sectors is equal to the ratio of the marginal products in the two sectors). The ratio of the
wage bill in the two sectors is derived using the data on sectoral wages and the farm share of the
labor force, given in Table 1, pp. 8-9 (and, following Clark, p. 7, letting the non-farm wage be
the average of urban craftsman and laborer wages). The resulting output series is divided by the
non-agricultural labor force, derived using Clark’s farm share of the labor force and the annual
labor force series described above.
Total Factor Productivity in Agriculture
1500-1911: Clark (forthcoming 2002), Table 9, p. 48; data for 1520, 1550, 1570, 1590; decadal
from 1605; interpolated to get annual. We assume that the 1520-1550 growth rate applied to
1500-1520.
1911-1936: derived assuming constant growth rate of 0.4% p. a. 1911-1924; 2.1% p. a. 1924-
1936. Based on R. C. O. Matthews, C. H. Feintstein, and J. C. Odling-Smee, British Economic
Growth 1856-1973 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1982), Table L.2, p. 607 and Table
I.3, p. 598. The calculation assumes that the 1899-1913 growth rate persisted until 1924.Appendix 2
Dutch and French Wage-Rent Ratio Series 1374-1940
2.1 Dutch Wage-Rent Ratio Series 1500-1914
Nominal Rents per Hectare (guilders): Holland, 1500-1830 [1]
Background data to Graph 2, p. 74 in Jan Luiten van Zanden, “The Development of Agricultural
Productivity in Europe 1500-1800,” NEHA-jaarboek 61 (1998): 66-85. Data sent by van Zanden
to the authors July 3, 2000. It should be pointed out that van Zanden’s Graph 1 plots rent trends
1451-1825 in Flanders and Brabant, and while these two show a sharp plunge from 1451/1475 to
1576/1600, the series for Holland shows no fall at all, but rather a rise.
Nominal Rents per Hectare (guilders): the Netherlands, 1820-1910 [2]
As five-year averages starting 1820-24, average for all of the Netherlands, farm land and pasture,
sent July 6, 2000 as an email attachment (along with description) from Arthur van Riel.
Nominal Land Prices per Hectare in Groningen (guilders): northern Netherlands, 1713-
1914 [3]
Prices of farmland in Groningen, sent July 6, 2000 as an email attachment (along with
description) from Arthur van Riel.
Nominal Daily Wage (Amsterdam, building trades, painter’s wage 1749-53=100), 1500-
1910 [4]
H. Nusteling, Welvaart en Werkgelegenheid in Amsterdam 1540-1860 (Amsterdam: De
Bataafsche Leeuw 1985), Table 5.2, index R3 (weighted average of R1, carpenters, and R2,
painters), pp. 255-7.
Nominal Daily Wage (Amsterdam), 1910-1939 [5]
D. J. van der Veen and J. L. van Zanden, “Real-Wage Trends and Consumption Patterns in the
Netherlands, c.1870-1940,” in P. Scholliers (ed.), Real Wages in 19
th and 20
th Century Europe:
Historical and Comparative Perspectives (New York: Berg 1989), Table 8.6, pp. 227-8.
Linking the Series: the Netherlands 1500-1914
For 1500-1830, we construct wage-rent series as [4]/[1], interpolating over missing years. For
1820-1910, we construct the series as [4]/[2], interpolating over missing years. The two series are
linked at decade average over 1820-1830 = 1825. For 1910-1914, we construct wage-rent series
[5]/[3], linking this extension to the previous series at 1910. 
2.2 French Wage-Rent Ratio Series 1450-1940
1450-1775: Paris region 
Wage-rent ratios are from personal correspondence with Philip Hoffman, based on the Paris
region. These data underlie his Growth in a Traditional Society: The French Countryside, 1450-
1815 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), where, for example, nominal rent is
reported in Table 4.2, col. (3), p. 90. Hoffman’s observations are decade averages. We interpolate
geometrically the missing years (e.g., decade beginning 1450 is average for 1450-1459, which we
take as 1455 in the interpolation procedure).1700-1870: Normandy and Provence regions 
Jean-Laurent Rosenthal reports wage-rent ratios for France in his The Fruits of Revolution:
Property Rights, Litigation, and French Agriculture, 1700-1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992). His Table A1.1, pp. 183-4 reports for Normandy 1702-1870 nominal
land prices (V), the wage rate (w) and the interest rate (i), and his Table A1.3, p. 187 has the
same data for Provence 1700-1855. We derive the rent estimates from land prices by using the
simplest (very) long run capital asset model where r/i=V so that w/r=w/(V)(i).
1870-1940: Basse Normandy region
The rent data are for the Basse Normandy region, and they are taken from Maurice Levy-Leboyer, Le
Revenue Agricole et la Rente Fonciere en Basse-Normandie: Etude de Croissance Regionale (Paris:
Editions Lincksieck, 1972), Table K-62, p. 200 where he reports a land rent series for the whole region
(variant II, col. 4). The nominal wage rate is taken from Jeanne Singer-Kérel, Le coût de la vie à Paris de
1840 a 1954 (Paris: A. Colin, 1961), Table 43, pp. 536-7.
Linking the sources into a complete 1450-1940 series: 
The full series is linked in five parts: the 1450-1750 portion of the Paris region series is linked to
the next at 1750; the 1750-1775 portion is an unweighted average of the Normandy, Provence
and Paris region series, linked to the next at 1775; the 1775-1855 portion is an unweighted
average of the Normandy and Provence region series, linked to the next at 1855; the 1855-1870
portion uses the Provence region series, linked to the next at 1870; and the 1870-1940 portion
uses the Basse-Normandie region rent series with the all-France nominal wage underlying J. G.
Williamson, “The Evolution of Global Labor Markets Since 1830: Background Evidence and
Hypotheses,” Explorations in Economic History 32, 2 (April 1995), 141-96.  